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ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the evidence of financial integration, with covered
interest parity (CIP), for a group of countries that have already adopted the euro
and another group of countries that kept their currencies. We use detrended cross-
correlation analysis, which allows analyzing the behavior of time series even when they
are not stationary. The main results indicate that countries that adopted the euro do not
show much evidence in favor of CIP, before joining the Eurozone, which could imply
they will not benefit from all common currency advantages. In the group of countries
that did not adopt the euro, Denmark, Sweden, the UK and the Czech Republic are
the ones presenting better conditions for financial integration with the euro, while Bul-
garia has also some evidence of this. Some possible explanations of CIP deviations are
agents not considering all countries’ assets as similar and also the underdevelopment of
markets and liquidity problems (more pronounced due to periods of turmoil).
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2 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
1. Financial Integration: A Brief Literature Review
The decision to adopt a common currency brought many benefits to the
countries involved. Among these benefits, we can name better allocation of
savings, which will lead to better investment returns, allowing countries to
reach better economic performance, with increasing levels of consumption.
Financial integration, which means that financial markets are closely linked
together, also leads to reduced borrowing costs (due to more competition),
lower intermediation costs (for the same reason) and the harmonization
of product prices and financial services. In fact, with financial integration
between countries, we can expect higher market efficiency.
However, financial integration is also an institutional challenge. First, a
rapid integration of financial markets (noted by the increase in the volume of
capital flow between countries) could increase currencies’ exposure to risk,
facilitating the emergence of crisis on a global scale. In addition, and prob-
ably more importantly, when countries decide to adopt a common currency,
they lose their monetary authority which could be an important instrument
to combat possible asymmetric shocks in their economy. In the context of
integrated economics, an asymmetric shock is an event that occurs in a given
country and not in all integrated countries. Therefore, it is more difficult
to take measures to face that shock. So adopting the euro when finan-
cial integration is not complete could result in greater disparities between
countries.1
We base our study on covered interest parity (CIP) which is considered as
a pure criterion of capital mobility (see, for example, Frankel, 1992). With
instruments that cover exchange risks, investors carry out arbitrage opera-
tions and eliminate differentials between the returns on similar assets (similar
in maturity, political and sovereign risks, among others) except in currency
denomination. With capital mobility between countries, arbitrage assures
that differentials, which represent riskless profits, are eliminated. Frankel
(1993) shows that we only need the abolition of capital controls to have
reduced profit opportunities.
The Eurozone now has 18 members. In the first phase, 12 countries
adopted the euro: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lux-
embourg, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Several studies
have been made of these countries, regarding financial integration, before
their decision to adopt the common currency. In addition, the same method-
ology we apply in this paper was also applied to those countries, showing
that Central European countries could foresee better financial integration,
while Southern European countries showed some non-verification of CIP
(see, for example, Ferreira, Dionision, & Pires, 2010, or Ferreira, 2011).
In recent years, other countries have adopted the euro (Slovenia in 2007,
Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011 and Latvia in
2014) and Lithuania entered the currency union at the beginning of 2015.
1For more information about the benefits and risks of financial integration see, for example,
Lemmen (1996).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [b
-o
n: 
Bi
bli
ote
ca
 do
 co
nh
ec
im
en
to 
on
lin
e U
Ev
or
a] 
at 
04
:33
 09
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 3
Some of these countries are analyzed in this paper, namely Slovakia, Esto-
nia and Latvia.2 Besides these countries, we also study verification of CIP in
other non-euro countries, to evaluate whether they are in a position to sup-
port a future decision to adopt the euro. In fact, due to the advantages and
disadvantages of adopting a common currency, evidence of financial integra-
tion is an important way to study whether a country will benefit from all the
advantages of financial integration.
The main objective of this study is to analyze verification of CIP in these
countries. For countries that have already adopted the euro, this was impor-
tant because they should verify this condition to explore all the potentialities
of the common currency. For countries that may adopt the euro in the future,
it is also important to analyze if that decision will be correct or not. We
made this analysis using a relatively recent methodology: detrended cross-
correlation analysis (DCCA). As far as we know, this methodology has never
been used to study financial integration in these countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
CIP conditions and presents some different ways to analyze this. Section 3
presents data and the methodology used in this study (DCCA and its corre-
lation coefficient). Section 4 reports on the empirical analysis and its results
and Section 5 concludes.
2. Covered interested parity
Considering forward contracts as the instruments to cover risks, we can
formalize CIP in short maturities (less than one year) as follows:
Ft+1
St
= 1+ i
∗
t
1+ it (1)
where i is the nominal interest rate, S the spot exchange rate,3 F the forward
exchange rate and the symbol * is used for foreign variables (since we com-
pare CIP with the euro, it refers to the Euribor rate). Taking the logarithm
of the previous equation we get:4
ft+1 − st = i∗t − it (2)
Rearranging the previous equation, and isolating the national rate, we have
it = i∗t − (ft+1 − st) (3)
Defining ic∗t = i∗t − (ft+1 − st) as the covered foreign rate and including an
error term, we have the equation it = ic∗t + εt, where ε is a Gaussian error.
2Our sample does not include all those countries due to lack of data availability.
3Units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency
4We assume that ln(1 + z) = z, an assumption normally used when z is a small value in
relation to 1.
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4 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
Table 1. Beginning of samples and number of observations used in the study
Country Date of beginning Number observations
Estonia 29 March 2004 1765
Latvia 29 March 2004 2547
Slovakia 11 February 2002 1798
Bulgariaa 29 March 2004 2671
Czech Republic 1 January 1999 4037
Denmark 1 January 1999 4037
Hungaryb 1 January 1999 4037
Lithuania 29 March 2004 2671
Poland 11 February 2002 3226
Romania 29 March 2004 2671
Swedenc 1 January 1999 4037
UK 1 January 1999 4037
a For 6 and 12-month maturity, sample only begins on 5 October 2007, with n = 1752.
b For 12-month maturity, sample only begins on 2 January 2003, with n = 2993.
c For 12-month maturity, sample ends on 1 March 2013, with n = 3696.
Table 2. Long-range average correlation coefficient for different maturities and countries
Country 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months
Estonia 0.1581 –0.1058 –0.3475 –0.1495
Latvia –0.2579 –0.5281 –0.2747 –0.2669
Slovakia 0.1262 –0.1836 –0.4002 –0.5488
Lithuania 0.2298 –0.2701 –0.4776 –0.5524
Denmark 0.7438 0.6957 0.6816 0.6713
Sweden 0.1944 0.1245 0.4982 0.0766
UK 0.6854 0.6197 0.4768 0.0443
Bulgaria 0.4155 0.2018 0.0247 –0.2537
Czech Republic 0.4263 0.3275 0.1698 –0.0236
Hungary 0.0208 0.0353 –0.1285 –0.5760
Poland 0.0181 0.0952 0.0345 –0.1677
Romania –0.0405 –0.1882 –0.5386 –0.6086
In order to test CIP empirically, we need to estimate the following equation:
it = α + βic∗t + εt (4)
CIP holds when α = 0 and β = 1; thus, testing CIP is equivalent to testing
these two conditions. Transaction costs, obstacles preventing capital mobil-
ity such as government restrictions to capital circulation and political risk5
are detected in the constant term, with this showing a non-zero value. On the
other hand, the constant detects differentials due to differences in the fiscal
treatment of returns, financial restrictions imposed by governments or data
imperfections.
5See Aliber (1973). Political risk is the probability of future government intervention in
financial markets. It tells us that if an investor anticipates the government’s intention to impose
obstacles to capital mobility, he will demand an extra premium for his investment.
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Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 5
Figure 1. Behavior at 95% confidence levels, for different numbers of observations.
Figure 2. DCCA correlation coefficient for Estonia.
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6 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
CIP conditions could be studied in different ways. One of the most com-
mon is to analyze CIP differentials, analyzing the stationarity of εt = it − ic∗t .
Almost all studies use information from Central European countries and the
results generally point to confirmation of CIP. For example, the work by
Ferreira (2011), Holmes (2003) or Holmes and Pentecost (1996), among
others, finds differentials that are eliminated over time, showing evidence in
favor of financial EU integration. Few cases, with these countries, show evi-
dence against CIP. One is the study by Holmes and Wu (1997), who find
significant covered interest differentials. Exchange rate turbulence and Ger-
man unification in 1990, an asymmetric shock, are the reasons advanced for
these results. However, when more peripheral countries are included in sam-
ples, results show that financial integration is not complete. For example,
the study by Ferreira (2011) shows that countries such as Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal or Spain present some violations of CIP. Concerning Euro-
zone countries, they do not show great evidence of CIP, which is coherent
with previous studies. It means that countries where CIP is violated could
face some problems in the case of asymmetric shocks. For other countries,
Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic show some
evidence of these financial integration criteria.
Another approach could be the direct analysis of equation (4), but as
both series used in the equation are commonly non-stationary, methodolo-
gies could not use Ordinary Least Squares. However, studying co-integration
could give information about confirmation or not of CIP in its weak form.
Figure 3. DCCA correlation coefficient for Latvia.
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Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 7
Some studies also use this methodology and the results are similar to those
found when analyzing CIP differentials (see, for example, Ferreira, 2011).
Besides this, the development of econometric methodologies allows
researchers to use alternative methodologies. General Maximum Entropy is
one of these methodologies and allows, for co-integrated series, direct anal-
ysis of equation (4). Ferreira et al. (2010) used this methodology and found,
once again, that Central European countries show more evidence of CIP than
Southern European ones.
In this paper we propose analysis of CIP conditions using methodologies
that are originally used in physical statistics.
3. Data and Methodology
As already mentioned, we propose to analyze financial integration in several
European Union countries, divided in two different groups. We exclude the
first group of countries that adopted the euro because they have already been
studied using this methodology (Ferreira, Dionísio, & Zebende, 2014). One
of the groups is composed of countries that adopted the euro more recently:
Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. Data were available for these countries and,
in this case, the dataset ends on the last day of their former currencies
(respectively, 31 December 2010, 2013 and 2008).
Figure 4. DCCA correlation coefficient for Slovakia.
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8 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
For all other countries, the dataset ends on 23 June 2014. Lithuania joined
the euro at the beginning of 2015, so this is a very important analysis regard-
ing its decision. The remaining countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK are not in the
eurogroup) are also analyzed.
We test CIP using assets with maturity up to 12 months (1, 3, 6 and 12
months), made with onshore assets: interbank interest rates, in the currency
of each country. To study financial integration we have to use spot and for-
ward exchange rates for each country in relation to the euro. We use daily
data from DataStream. Choice of this database is due to relative homogene-
ity within the data. Samples were recovered according to data availability
and information about the samples is given in Table 1.
When we want to compare behavior between series using financial time
series, one problem is the possibility of non-stationarity, which prevents us
from using some econometric techniques. Even if series are co-integrated,
Ordinary Least Squares results cannot be fully interpreted because the
hypothesis analyzes the correlation between series (even though generating
estimates that are super-consistent).
In this context, Podobnik and Stanley (2008) developed DCCA, a method
that can calculate the cross-correlation between two non-stationary series.
It is a generalization of Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA), a technique
used to analyze temporal dependence in time series with the advantage of
Figure 5. DCCA correlation coefficient for Lithuania.
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Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 9
Figure 6. DCCA correlation coefficient for Denmark.
being used in the context of non-stationary time series (Peng et al., 1994).6
Originally used to explain behavior in natural science phenomena, both tech-
niques could also be applied to economic time series, namely financial data
(see, for example, Podobnik, Horvatic, Petersen, & Stanley, 2009, or Wang,
Wei, & Wu, 2013, among others).
As DCCA has the advantage of studying financial series even when they
are not stationary, we can analyze their behavior directly from equation (4),
rather than calculating CIP differentials. As previously mentioned, the use
of CIP differentials is an alternative way to study this question, analyzing
whether they are stationary. Physical statistics could even be used to analyze
CIP differentials in future work.
Considering the data given by xk and yk with k = 1, . . . , t equidis-
tant observations. The first step of DCCA is obtained by integrating both
series and calculating the values: x(t) =∑tk=1 xk and y(t) =
∑t
k=1 yk. After-
wards, we divide them into N–n overlapping boxes, defining for each
box the local trend (x˜kand y˜k), using ordinary least squares. After this,
the detrended series is calculated; i.e. the difference between the original
6In our study, we use a correlation coefficient from DCCA which also implies calculation of
detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA), which analyzes the behavior of individual series. How-
ever, we use the exponent from DFA only indirectly. So we do not explain this methodology
in detail. For more information, see the original work on DFA (Peng et al., 1994). For a brief
literature review, see the work by Ferreira and Dionísio (2014).
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10 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
values and its trend. Then, we calculate the covariance of the residu-
als in each box given by f 2DCCA = 1n−1
∑i+n
k=i(xk − x˜k)(yk − y˜k). Finally, the
detrended covariance is calculated summing all N–n boxes of size n, given
by F2DCCA(n) = 1(N−n)
∑N−n
i=1 f
2
DCCA. This process should be repeated for
different length boxes in order to find the relationship between DCCA
fluctuation function and n size, which allows us to find the long-range cross-
correlation FDCCA(n) given by the power law FDCCA(n)n˜λ. Interpretation of
λ is quite similar to interpretation of DFA: if λ is equal to 0.5, series have
no long range cross-correlation; a λ greater than 0.5 means persistent long-
range cross-correlations while values lower than 0.5 mean anti-persistent
cross-correlation (a large value in one variable is likely to be followed by a
small value in another, and vice versa).
DCCA gives us information about cross-correlation between series but
does not quantify that value. In order to make that quantification, from
the results of DCCA between x and y and DFA for each series, Zebende
(2011) created the correlation coefficient given by ρDCCA = F
2
DCCA
FDFA{xi}FDFA{yi}.
This coefficient has the general properties of one correlation coefficient,
namely −1 ≤ ρDCCA ≤ 1. A value of ρDCCA = 0 means that there is no
cross-correlation between series, while a positive or negative value means,
respectively, cross-correlation or anti cross-correlation between series.
Figure 7. DCCA correlation coefficient for Sweden.
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Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 11
Figure 8. DCCA correlation coefficient for UK.
According to Podobnik, Jiang, Zhou, & Stanley (2011), we can test the
significance of this correlation coefficient. The authors estimate the critical
points for this test and we use them to test our coefficients.
4. Results of Application of DCCA to CIP
Our objective is to apply DCCA to both variables present in equation (4). As
referred to previously, DCCA has the advantage of being applied in the pres-
ence of non-stationary time series, such as those applied in CIP. In the context
of CIP, we interpret the existence of significant positive cross-correlation as
evidence of CIP in its weak form, meaning there is evidence of financial
integration. When correlation is not positively significant, it means there is
some violation of CIP. With the identified methodology, we calculated the
long-range correlation coefficient for our data. The methodology we pro-
pose calculates, for each country and maturity, one correlation coefficient
for each length box we use in the DFA and DCCA analysis. Table 2 presents
the average correlation coefficient for each country and maturity.7
We can conclude that almost half the correlation coefficients are negative,
meaning that the relation between variables in equation (4) is contrary to
7Since presentation of all results is not practical due to space constraints, we do not show
them. However, results are available on request.
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12 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
Figure 9. DCCA correlation coefficient for Bulgaria.
that expected by CIP. As well as this conclusion, Denmark is the country
with the highest correlation coefficients, in different maturities, followed by
the UK.
The average correlation coefficient could give us some information about
which countries have less correlation between the variables considered in
equation (4). However, it does not give us any information about the signifi-
cance of that correlation. So we proceeded to test the respective hypothesis.
The null hypothesis is that both variables are uncorrelated, meaning that
ρDCCA = 0. The alternative hypothesis rejects this and implies the existence
of significant correlation between variables, which could be interpreted as
verification of CIP at least in its weak form.
With our data, and according to each country’s number of observations,
we simulated the critical values at 90%, 95% and 99% for testing, according
to the procedure of Podobnik et al. (2011). Figure 1 shows the behavior of
critical values for series with 523 and 2400 observations, from the minimum
length box (n = 4) to the maximum (n = N/4). We have the same figures
for the number of observations used in this paper, which are supplied on
request.
We compiled all the information on correlation coefficients for each coun-
try, maturity and length boxes, with critical values at 95% level, as seen in
Figures 2 to 13. At the top we can see the DFA exponents for each series
used in the test (it on the left and ic∗t on the right) and at the bottom the
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Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 13
absolute values of F2DCCA (left) and ρDCCA (right). In the last one, the full line
identifies the 95% confidence level, while the other lines represent the cor-
relation coefficient for each maturity, depending on the length boxes. While
the correlation coefficient is above the upper line, the correlation coefficient
is positively significant, showing evidence of CIP in its weak form.
We start the empirical analysis with the countries that have already
adopted the euro: Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia (respectively, Figures 2, 3
and 4). For these countries, evidence is against verification of CIP. In fact,
Estonia has only minor evidence of CIP verification for shorter boxes for
1-month maturity. In Slovakia the evidence of CIP is also minimal and for
1-month maturity. Latvia has no evidence of CIP.
Besides Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia, which have already adopted the
euro, Lithuania joined the currency at the beginning of 2015. For this
country, confirmation of CIP is also very important, as previously stated.
However, and as for the previous countries analyzed, CIP is only confirmed
for 1-month maturity. For other maturities, CIP is rejected (see Figure 5).
The remaining countries in our sample could be divided into two groups:
countries that were EU members when the euro was created (Denmark,
Sweden and the UK) and countries that entered the EU after its creation
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania).
The first group is composed of three countries that decided not to adopt
the euro, and their results can be consulted in Figures 6, 7 and 8. Denmark
Figure 10. DCCA correlation coefficient for the Czech Republic.
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14 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
has strong evidence of CIP, with the correlation coefficient always being
positively significant, independently of the maturity or box dimension. The
evidence is also relatively strong for the UK, while for Sweden the coefficient
is significant for 6-month maturity and for other maturities it is significant
for higher boxes.
The last group includes those countries that entered the EU after cre-
ation of the euro but kept their own currency: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Romania (Figures 9 to 13).
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic show some evidence of CIP verification
(greater in the latter country). The remaining countries (Hungary, Poland
and Romania) do not show any evidence of CIP verification.
Our results are in line with previous studies made of the same countries.
For example, for the first group of countries we study (Eurozone members),
few studies include these countries, due to the scarcity of data. Regarding
Slovakia, Herrmann and Jochem (2003) find evidence of CIP rejection, which
is confirmed in our results. For the other two countries (Estonia and Latvia),
to the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies on CIP. The same occurs with
Lithuania, which joined the Eurozone at the beginning of 2015,
Another group is formed by countries that decided not to adopt the com-
mon currency when it was created (Denmark, Sweden and the UK). For these
countries, the results are coherent with previous studies. In fact, in the set of
countries used in this paper, these countries have more studies on CIP, due
Figure 11. DCCA correlation coefficient for Hungary.
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Revisiting Covered Interest Parity in the European Union 15
to the fact that they belonged to the EU before the creation of the common
currency. Similar results can be found in studies by Ferreira et al. (2010),
Holmes and Pentecost (1996, 1999) or Lemmen (1996).
Concerning the other countries we study in this paper, as far as we can
know, Bulgaria has no studies on CIP, so results cannot be compared.
Regarding the Czech Republic, although studies are not numerous, they
show similar patterns in this economy to those of other countries that
adopted the common currency, with some support for CIP verification (see,
for example, Ferreira, 2011, or Filipozzi and Staehr, 2013). The results for
Hungary, Poland and Romania, which do not show any evidence of CIP ver-
ification, are in line with previous studies of these countries: for Hungary
and Poland see, for example, Ferreira (2011), Herrmann and Jochem (2003)
or Filipozzi and Staehr (2013). In the Romanian case, the study by Filipozzi
and Staehr (2013) is the only one including this country.
One possible problem with our data is the fact that we have different
sample dimensions for our countries, due to different data availability. It
is useful to study time series from the moment they become available, to
achieve more conclusive results. However, we applied our methodology to
these countries from March 2004 and the results are qualitatively similar,
giving us information about the robustness of our results. The exception is
found in the results for the Czech Republic: for this country, results with that
smaller sample, clearly point to evidence of CIP verification. However, this
Figure 12. DCCA correlation coefficient for Poland.
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16 Paulo Ferreira & Andreia Dionísio
Figure 13. DCCA correlation coefficient for Romania.
is an expected result and also coherent with previous studies, which were
stated above.
5. Conclusions
With the advance of the integration process between EU countries, with
some of them adopting a common currency, levels of financial integration
are expected to rise. Besides the adoption of the same currency by some
countries, the fact that capital controls were progressively abolished in the
EU should lead to this result. However, this study, as others, shows this may
not be the case.
One explanation may be that some remaining factors could prevent com-
plete financial integration. The political risk, defined by Aliber (1973), and
related to the possibility of reinserting controls, is one of them. The recent
crisis in the euro, which even raised the hypothesis of some countries exiting
the common currency, could be interpreted as a particular case of this prob-
lem. The existence of asymmetric information, transaction costs or different
fiscal treatment of returns in the different countries are other factors that
can explain our conclusions. These are not legal barriers but they can affect
capital mobility, implying that countries do not fully exploit the potential
benefits of financial integration (see, for example, Ferreira, 2011).
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With the absence of transaction costs, when assets are really similar, CIP
differentials are expected to be nil. If they exist, they are expected to decrease
until all profitable opportunities are eliminated and evidence in favor of CIP
is found. However, it is also possible that agents do not consider all countries’
assets as similar. In this case, CIP could also fail. This could be one of the
causes of CIP deviations in some of the countries. Probably, investors do not
feel that all European assets have the same risks.
The fact that, during the sample period, the Eurozone has experienced a
severe financial crisis, in part due to problems in the money market, could
also explain some of those CIP deviations. Indeed, Taylor (1989) presents
market turbulence as a possible cause of those deviations. Furthermore, stud-
ies such as those by Baba and Packer (2009a, 2009b) and Hui, Genberg, and
Chung (2011) also point to deviations linked with market turbulence. These
authors advance three main conclusions about CIP deviations: (i) differences
in the counterparty risk between European and US financial institutions; (ii)
there was some behavior by both monetary institutions to stabilize swap
markets (after identifying problems of liquidity in these markets); (iii) less
liquidity in markets, during the crisis. Although the first of the three motives
should not be directly considered, the behavior of different monetary author-
ities in these European countries could justify some deviations. However,
liquidity problems could be a reason for CIP failure. In fact, mainly in coun-
tries that joined the EU in 2004 or later, CIP rejection could also be a signal of
some underdevelopment or lack of liquidity of their financial markets, espe-
cially when compared with other EU members (see, for example, Ferreira,
2011 or Herrmann and Jochem, 2003).
It is also important to understand that CIP violation could be caused
by some frictions that provoke differentials but do not mean riskless profit
opportunities.
First, in the presence of transaction costs, CIP differentials do not necessar-
ily mean the existence of profit opportunities. If the differentials are smaller
than the transaction costs, they do not generate profit opportunities. Based
on this assumption, Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977) elaborate a neutral
band for parity, within which differentials are not synonymous with riskless
profit opportunities. Outside this band, differentials could mean different
tax treatment, sovereign risk, government controls, non-infinite demand
and supply elasticities, transaction costs, information costs, capital controls,
imperfect asset substitutability or even measurement errors. The absence of
long-range correlation between markets could be interpreted as differentials
outside the neutral band. Alternatively, rejection of CIP could also be a sign
of monetary autonomy. However, in the case of countries that are in the
Eurozone (or which will enter), this should not be a reason for CIP devia-
tions, since those countries are subject to strict rules regarding their adoption
of the common currency, as far as monetary policies are concerned. For
countries that are non-euro members, this could be a motive for deviations.
But the most important conclusion for euro members, in our view, is
that our results could show that some countries did not gain the advan-
tages expected from full financial integration. Furthermore, rejection of CIP
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could imply that those countries did not have the capacity to face asymmetric
shocks, which is a great challenge for their governments. The same conclu-
sion should be made for Lithuania, which entered the Eurozone recently
and also shows evidence against CIP. For these countries, since they have
no monetary policy instruments of their own, and because budgetary mea-
sures are also limited, they could face difficulties in solving possible economic
problems.
For the remaining countries, the absence of CIP verification could be a
problem if they are interested in adopting the common currency. It is inter-
esting that CIP evidence is more visible in countries that have been longer in
the EU (Denmark, Sweden and the UK), showing evidence in favor of finan-
cial integration. The pattern of correlation for integrated economies should
be something like the Danish results, where CIP is always confirmed. This
could be explained, for example, by Denmark’s possible interest in joining
the Eurozone, as has been noted in the past.
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